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The Role of the Media in The
Operational Deception Plan for Operation
Desert Storm

A Monograph
by

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas L. Tystad
Armor

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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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LTC Douglas L. Tystad, Armor

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School of Advanced Military Studies
ATTN: AT2L-SWV
Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
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Lieutenant Colonel Douglas L. Tystad

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Approved By:

Robert H. Berlin Monograph Director
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

James R. McDonough Director, School of
Colonel James R. McDonough Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

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ABSTRACT

"The Role of the Media in the Operational Deception Plan for Operation Desert Storm." by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas L. Tystad, Armor, 46 pages.

This monograph examines the operational deception plan used in Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 28 February 1991 in relation to U.S. Army deception doctrine.

Using the deception plan from Operation Overlord in World War II to illustrate the deception framework, the monograph analyzes the operational deception plan from Operation Desert Storm. The author contends that the deception plan was successful because it synchronized air, naval, and ground unit efforts toward deceiving the enemy. General Schwarzkopf, commander of Central Command, credited the deception plan with helping establish the conditions for success by keeping the Iraqi forces focused on the wrong locations for the ground campaign.

The focus of the monograph is on whether the media were useful in furthering the deception plan for Desert Storm. With an unprecedented number of journalists covering the Gulf War, understanding why and how the deception plan was still successful is important for the military. The monograph examines whether the media were considered a serious source of intelligence by the enemy, whether there was an organized effort to exploit the media in the deception plan, and whether the professional analysts had any effect on the deception plan.

The author concludes that although there was no organized plan to use the media to further the deception plan, the media were nonetheless helpful in furthering the deception. The monograph concludes with lessons and possible implications for the future deception planner. It also makes recommendations for future media guidelines in war zones. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, the media-military relationship on future battlefields will continue to undergo change. This monograph shows how the operational planners were successful in Desert Storm and may provide insight for future deception planners.

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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLAN FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM

The history of warfare is replete with examples of deception being used to gain advantage over an enemy. The ancient military theorist Sun Tzu wrote "all warfare is based on deception."¹ His writings contained numerous references to the need to consider deception in all plans and operations.

The classic theorists Jomini and Clausewitz also discussed deception in their writings. Jomini drew the conclusion that the enemy commander must be the target of deception efforts and that the deception must be presented through numerous sources in order to be effective.² Clausewitz was more cautious in his approach to deception. He wrote that surprise was essential on the battlefield and that speed and secrecy were the main ingredients. Clausewitz merged secrecy with deception in his writings.³

Clausewitz keenly noted one potential problem in dealing with the press on the battlefield. He wrote "... the direction from which [the enemy] threatens our country will usually be announced in the press before the first shot is fired."⁴ The free press on the battlefield has imposed a new dimension for commanders desiring to deceive their enemy. The press is dedicated to finding and reporting the story of the war for the public while the military attempts to maintain secrecy concerning plans and dispositions. With the advent of modern communications technology and the subsequent global makeup of the audience, the media have the capability to report almost

instantaneously from the battlefield to worldwide audiences.

The commander attempting to conduct a deception operation under the scrutiny of the press must maintain not only operational security of his plans, but must also meet the legitimate needs of a free press. Operation Desert Storm provides the most recent example of a successful deception operation conducted in war despite a free and aggressive press. The U.S.-led coalition forces conducted deception operations to set the stage for the dramatic victory gained after a devastating air campaign and just 100 hours of ground combat. The war was covered by an unprecedented number of journalists in the war zone using the latest in communications technology. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, attributed part of the success of Operation Desert Storm to the deception campaign planned and orchestrated at the operational level of war.⁵

The purpose of this study is to determine if the media were useful as a method of furthering the deception plan for Operation Desert Storm. First, the study will survey the current and emerging deception doctrine. Then, the deception plan will be analyzed to see how the doctrine was applied. The study will then focus on the media coverage to determine the effects on the deception operation. Finally, the paper will reach conclusions on the deception operation and the role of the media as well as consider possible lessons for future operational planners.⁶

In the aftermath of Desert Storm, the media have not only objected to the way the military

managed the public affairs business, but have also complained of being used to further the deception effort. Future military operations will have to contend with media that have a technological capability to bypass the military system as well as being distrustful of military attempts to control information. Deception under these conditions will be more difficult and may require additional planning considerations.

DECEPTION DOCTRINE

Deception is defined as those measures designed to mislead enemy forces by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.⁷ Deception as a means of gaining advantage over an enemy is found in both Joint and Army doctrine.

Joint doctrine discusses deception in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. This manual defines basic war fighting philosophy and has a section which recognizes the significance of deception in war.⁸ Joint Pub 3-58, Deception Operations, is currently in the writing and approval process. Since these manuals were not in existence during Operation Desert Storm, they will not be considered in this paper.

The current Army deception doctrine is principally found in two manuals: FM 100-5 Operations, May 1986, and FM 90-2 Battlefield Deception, October 1988. Deception is discussed, although rather sparsely, in corps, division, and brigade warfighting manuals. In early 1990, a proposed concept stressing "deceptiveness" in operations was drafted and circulated for comment.

This concept paper was provided to the CENTCOM planners and so will be discussed in this paper. It is currently titled Draft Tradoc Pam 525-XX Deceptiveness in AirLand Operations in final draft form dated September 1991.

The Army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, lists deception as an integral part of any campaign plan. The manual states the basic doctrine for deception planning at the operational and tactical levels. The manual also lists the basic principles of deception for any plan as "simple, believable, and not so costly that it diverts resources from the main effort."⁹ The target of the deception plan has to be the enemy commander capable of ordering the desired behavior. The manual states that the most effective form of deception is reinforcing what the enemy already believes so that he will be less likely to change his chosen course of action. Another simple form of deception covered is the creation of ambiguity in the mind of the enemy commander which can lead to exploitable weaknesses and create windows of vulnerability.¹⁰

The tactics and techniques of deception are detailed in FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception. FM 90-2 begins with an in-depth discussion of the theory of deception drawn from communications theory, gaming theory, and historical research. Noted British military author, Michael Dewar, writing in his book The Art of Deception in Warfare, correctly noted that the current FM 90-2 is a vast improvement over all previous efforts because not only is it based on theory, but it also provides ample techniques and tactics to use in deception planning and execution.¹¹ FM 90-2

sets out ten deception maxims based on theory for consideration in planning.¹²

The manual then lists the cornerstones of battlefield deception as Intelligence Support, Operations Security, and Integration and Synchronization.¹³ The first requires that not only does the operational planner do an Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, he must also look at the enemy in detail to find out what deception plans could work. In this regard, the intelligence analyst looks at what the enemy is likely to accept, what sources he uses and how he confirms his intelligence information, and generally how the enemy intelligence system works. The words of Sun Tzu, "Know your enemy" are essential for the planner to keep in mind when developing a deception operation.

Integration and synchronization requires that once the deception objective has been decided, it must be integrated into the operations. FM 90-2 lists four characteristics that must be considered in planning:

1. Flexibility
2. Doctrinally consistent with actual capabilities and intentions
3. Credible as to current battlefield conditions
4. Simple enough not to get confused during the heat of battle.¹⁴

Synchronization of all deception efforts requires centralized control of all assets.

Operations security (OPSEC) becomes the essential activity of a deception plan. OPSEC is used to establish the "base of secrecy" that contributes to deception effectiveness.¹⁵ OPSEC has to be considered very carefully because the planner wants to deny some elements of information

but give others in the deception plan. This is an area that deserves special attention when discussing the role of the media. The planner must understand the media security rules in effect and either plan accordingly or recommend changes to the rules. The commander is responsible for OPSEC and charges the G-3 for planning and staff supervision.

The manual lists 16 factors to be considered when planning deception operations. First among them is that deception is not a separate operation, but an integral part of any campaign plan. The deception objective, planning, and coordination have to be considered early in the planning cycle. Realism, flexibility, enemy and friendly capabilities, the forces required, the use of all means available, the liaison requirements and a feedback mechanism all have to be tied in to the timing.¹⁶ The media role appears to be important, although not mentioned in the manual, as a means available to the planner and should, therefore, be considered.

The theoretical foundation given, the manual then lists the components of battlefield deception operations. These are:

OBJECTIVE: This is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation given as a mission statement. It specifies the actions desired to be taken by the enemy so that friendly forces can then exploit.

TARGET: This is the enemy decision maker with the freedom of action to direct the actions that are desired in the objective. The decision maker can be targeted directly or doctrinally depending on the situation.

STORY: This is the friendly intention, capability, or action that the enemy is made to believe.

PLAN: This plan outlines the specific operations, displays, or secrets to be used to convey the deception story to the target. It is

listed in Operations Order format as an appendix to the campaign plan. Critical portions of the plan are given in the campaign plan execution paragraph.

EVENTS: These are the friendly indicators and actions that make up the story and are planned over time to accomplish the objective.¹⁷

This framework provides the deception planner with the standard language and format for communicating the deception plan. It can be used at either the operational or tactical level.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF DECEPTION

An historical example will illustrate the components of the framework as well as some of the factors and means. FM 90-2 uses the deception plan for Operation Overlord as one of the best examples of deception.

By 1944, the stage was set for the cross channel invasion. Both the Allies and the Germans knew that the invasion would take place, the only question was where.¹⁸ The Allies were facing enormous odds in trying to establish a foothold on the continent. In order to establish conditions for success, the Allied Command established a massive deception operation codenamed Operation Bodyguard. The principle operations to protect the Normandy invasion were codenamed Operation Fortitude (North and South).¹⁹

The objective of Operation Fortitude was to pin enemy forces in their locations as far as possible from the Overlord landing area and to lead the enemy to believe that the main invasion would not begin until late summer.²⁰ The target was Hitler and his senior commanders. Hitler was the primary decision maker for operational level decisions, especially the movement of reserves

from the Pas de Calais. He made his decisions without regard to what his intelligence service told him because he refused to accept any view which contradicted his own personal view of the situation.²¹

The Allied deception sought to convey the story that the Allies would not be in position to attack before spring. Further, there were to be two assaults conducted against Norway (Operation Fortitude North). The large scale invasion of the continent would be conducted in two phases. The first phase would be conducted from southwest England west of the Seine River to establish a foothold and draw reserves away from the main landing area. The second phase of the deception projected that the main invasion would come from southeast England against the Pas de Calais.²²

The plans for the Fortitude operations as well as supporting deception operations in the Mediterranean were controlled by the London Controlling Station.²³ This was a headquarters within the Allied command which coordinated all deception plans within the European Theater of Operations. Synchronization of plans was essential to ensure that the story remained consistent throughout.

The Allies relied heavily on controlled agents to sell the deception story. Notional radio traffic, notional orders of battle, and dummy landing craft in the notional staging areas were also used. The notional orders of battle centered on the First U.S. Army Group with General George Patton in command. The plan used real divisions in notional formations in order to keep

the plan realistic. Wholly notional formations were limited until after the invasion began.²⁴

The Allied "Cover and Deception Definition and Procedure" listed all the means available to the planner. Among these was the world press. The instructions listed two ways to use the press by first releasing false information. Second, the Allies staged real acts that were especially designed to deceive for coverage by the press.²⁵ Many of the calculated leaks in the press revolved around the notional units. Assignment notifications of soldiers arriving from the States were listed in the local press. Leaks about the First U.S. Army Group added to the reality of the notional unit.²⁶

Intelligence played a vital role in the deception operations. The use of ULTRA allowed the Allies to accurately determine what the Germans were thinking about invasion locations.²⁷ Armed with this intelligence, the deception planners could build and refine the operation to play to the German conception of the invasion operation.

Operation Fortitude was a total success. As late as D Day, the Germans were more concerned with the Pas de Calais as the primary invasion point. After the invasion, the enemy was paralyzed by the existence of the still uncommitted notional army.²⁸ As late as 27 June 1944, the German Commander in Chief, West, reported in his daily situation report that the Allies had still not committed the army group in southeast England. Further, the army was reported to be stronger than the army of Field Marshal Montgomery, which was committed in Normandy.²⁹

German forces were not moved west of the Seine River until after 1 July 1944.³⁰

The press played an important part in the deception operation. Although not decisive in selling the deception story, the press did serve as an independent source to help confirm German intelligence.³¹ Most of the German senior officers listened to the foreign broadcasts as their source of news because Hitler issued the "Order of Principle Number One" in June 1940 which severely limited information within the German Army.³²

The deception operations involved in Operation Overlord were immense and complicated. This example showed the framework required to conduct deception on a large scale and the potential for success that comes with a well planned and executed operation.


DECEPTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Deception in Operation Overlord was conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. FM 90-2 recognizes that differences exist between tactical and operational deception. The manual gives specific guidance for the operational level planner when building a deception operation, since at this level, the payoffs are greater³³.

The manual builds on AirLand Battle doctrine in the design of campaigns. The concepts of center of gravity, lines of operation, culminating points, and the development of branches and sequels work well not only in operational planning but also in deception planning. The key is that the deception objective and story be considered early in the planning.

One aspect of deception that possesses the greatest possibilities for the planner is the use of branches and sequels in the operational design. The more courses of action that can be presented to the enemy, the better the chance of deception success. As the diagram at Figure 1 shows, the branches allow options for the campaign planner for changing directions and making decisions based on the flow of the battle.

FIGURE 1
USE OF BRANCHES AND SEQUELS AS
DECEPTIONS



Source: FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, p 2-6.

These branches can be planned and resourced and then not executed but shown to the enemy. Since they are plausible and within the capability of the force, the enemy has to decide which to act against. If the enemy is predisposed to believe one of the branches, so much the better. All of this allows for great flexibility.

Finally, FM 90-2 lists means available. These include dummies, decoys, camouflage, smoke, people and things, false versus real, olfactory,

sonic, and electronic deception means. It lists techniques such as feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. It then lists those considerations that must be accounted for when fighting in a joint and combined arena. Significant among these are the political considerations inherent in a coalition plan. This is also the only section of the manual that lists the use of multinational assets, listing newspapers and public radio for the only time in the manual.³⁴

Noted British historian Michael Handel has accused the U.S. military of ignoring deception in operations since WWII. He wrote that the U.S. relied on overwhelming force rather than resort to strategem.³⁵ Others within the Army have voiced similar concerns.³⁶ Deception is seen as too much of an "add-on" program and not given due consideration in planning. Draft TRADOC PAM 525-XX was proposed to address this problem. The essence of this proposal is an expansion of the use of branches and sequels for deception (Figure 1 above). The concept is to build two viable operational courses of action in the planning stage. The sub-optimal course of action could then be developed as the deception plan. During the conduct of the operation, if the enemy does not react favorably to the deception but takes action to face the real course of action, a switch to the deception course of action may then be the optimal solution. This then places the enemy commander on the "horns of a dilemma" as to which actions he should take.³⁷

The value of this new "deceptiveness" concept is that it requires that the deception be considered early in the planning cycle. Also,

because the deception plan could be an actual course of action, it will have enhanced believability. The planner will then be required to apply resources to the course of action in order to make it possible to execute. The flexibility inherent in this concept fully supports AirLand Battle doctrine. The concept also helps the operational planner by defining the deception planning considerations inherent in the four operational phases.³⁸ As will be seen, this concept was partially used in the deception planning for Operation Desert Storm.

Prior to Desert Storm, the doctrine for deception was published and in the hands of the planners. The doctrine has been shown to be based on theory and historical practice. In General Norman Schwarzkopf, Central Command had a commander who was well educated in military history and in AirLand Battle doctrine. Faced with the situation in Southwest Asia, deception was a valid combat multiplier for Central Command.

DECEPTION IN DESERT STORM

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 set in motion a chain of events that led to Operation Desert Storm. The United States reacted to the invasion on the invitation of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The President stated the four principles or objectives for the deployment of U.S. military forces in a speech to the nation on 8 August 1990. These four principles were first the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Second, the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Third, stability in the

Persian Gulf region. And fourth, protection of American lives. The forces were originally committed for the defense of Saudi Arabia.³⁹

The Central Command began the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia based on a Presidential directive on 6 August. The initial problem confronting the CENTCOM staff was the defense of Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion. To help accomplish this defense, the staff produced a deception plan to make the U.S. forces appear more formidable and capable than they actually were at the time.⁴⁰ This paper does not focus on this deception plan but, it should be noted that deception was considered early in Desert Shield and deception planning carried over into the campaign plan for Desert Storm.

During the period prior to combat operations, the President and the coalition that he organized to oppose the Iraqi invasion set the tone for the military operations to come. In all addresses to the nation, to the coalition, through resolutions in the United Nations, and in the unprecedented exchange of televised messages to the people of Iraq on 16 September, President Bush remained consistent in his objectives for the military operation. In his message to the Iraqi people, he stressed that the U.S. had "...no quarrel with the people of Iraq. ...our only object is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein."⁴¹ Based on the comments of coalition leaders and the initial deployment of forces, the coalition appeared to display interest only in the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When viewed from the context of the Iraqi experience in war, all of these actions and statements probably led to the

Iraqi force dispositions in the theater. These appeared designed to defend Kuwait only and focused fairly heavily on coastal defense against an invasion from the sea. This appears to be a preconception of how the coalition would attack and becomes important to the discussion of the deception plan.

The CENTCOM planners faced a formidable challenge. Initially, they planned for the invasion of Kuwait with only one corps allocated to the defense of Saudi Arabia, the XVIII Airborne Corps, which was composed of four divisions: the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), the 24th Mechanized Infantry, and the 1st Cavalry (an armored division).⁴² Recognizing this as an insufficient force, the CENTCOM recommended and the National Command Authority agreed to order the deployment of the VII Corps from Germany. With this force and the coalition forces available, CENTCOM had sufficient ground forces available for the campaign (See Appendix B, Ground Forces Order of Battle).

Even with the ground forces listed and a vast air and naval armada available, CENTCOM was still presented with a numerically superior Iraqi army. General Schwarzkopf explained in his briefing of 27 February 1991 that the Iraqi forces outnumbered the coalition 2 to 1 and also outnumbered the coalition in numbers of tanks.⁴³ He also noted that the Iraqi disposition of forces presented an opportunity for a flanking attack as long as the Iraqi forces remained focused to the east.⁴⁴ He directed that a deception plan be developed to help establish conditions for swift and decisive maneuver during the ground campaign.

The deception concept was prepared by the special planning cell in the CENTCOM J-5. The concept was refined and published as an annex (as per FM 90-2) by a deception planning cell also in the J-5.⁴⁵ For clarity in explanation, the plan will be analyzed using the components of battlefield deception listed in FM 90-2 in the same manner as the WWII historical example.

OBJECTIVE: The objective of the deception plan was to reinforce the Iraqi belief that the coalition would only attack into Kuwait.⁴⁶ The reaction desired was actually one of inactivity. The objective was to have the Iraqi forces remain oriented east toward the coast and south and east of the Wadi al-Batin. The desire was to blind the Iraqi command to the movement of forces to the west of the Wadi al-Batin so that they would not extend the defensive line or move their operational reserves. The desired end was an assailable flank through Iraq for the main attack against the Republican Guards.⁴⁷

TARGET: The target of the deception was the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. He directed the alignment of the defense of Kuwait and the assignment of units. He also directed the positioning of the Republican Guards.⁴⁸

STORY: The story was that the main attack would come east of the Wadi al-Batin supported by an amphibious assault near Kuwait City and a Marine attack along the Kuwaiti coast.⁴⁹

PLAN: The plan was complex and comprehensive. Part of the air campaign was designed to destroy and degrade as much of the Iraqi intelligence system as possible. The coalition ground forces were arrayed initially in

defensive positions east of the Wadi al-Batin and were to move to final attack positions at the last possible moment. Feints and demonstrations were to be conducted in the Wadi by division sized forces. The First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was initially along the Gulf coast and was to move west to portray a main attack against the main defensive belt south of Kuwait City. The Saudi Corps would replace the First MEF and attack along the coast toward Kuwait City. An amphibious feint supported by naval gunfire would be conducted against the coastal defenses south of Kuwait City as well as the islands near the Kuwaiti coast.⁵⁰

Since CENTCOM was an operational level warfighting headquarters, the planners had to consider the tenets of AirLand Battle in their ground campaign design. The Iraqi Republican Guard forces were defined as the enemy center of gravity.⁵¹ With this in mind, all planning could focus on the operational maneuver to destroy those forces which should then lead to Iraqi defeat. The deception plan had to support the operational plan to provide conditions for success. The deception objective of holding the Republican Guard in place and oriented east as well as keeping the frontline forces from expanding their defenses to the west of the Wadi formed the basis of the plan.⁵²

The Iraqi forces had several exploitable weaknesses in their intelligence and command systems. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi reconnaissance had been poor. The Iraqi forces possessed sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment but showed a weakness in planning its

use and then reporting and analyzing the product. It was noted that the intelligence system provided more misinformation than information.⁵³ In addition, the Iraqi command and control structure was very centralized with Saddam Hussein being the major decision maker. Saddam Hussein placed a premium on loyalty and punished military failure severely. Because of this, his commanders were unwilling to report bad news to their superiors. In fact, the Iraqi commanders were noted as relying more on the news media for reliable front line information than on the Iraqi command and intelligence system.⁵⁴

Faced with a relatively unsophisticated opponent with very exploitable command and intelligence systems, the deception plan was drawn on the basis of the apparent Iraqi preconception that the attack would come only into Kuwait and would be supported by an amphibious assault.⁵⁵

Using a deception plan to exploit the preconceived ideas of an enemy is an example of the deception maxim of Magruder's principles from FM 90-2. This maxim shows that it is easier to maintain an enemy pre-existing belief with a deception plan than to present notional evidence to change that belief.⁵⁶ The disposition of Iraqi forces in Kuwait as shown on map 1 in Appendix A, shows the Iraqi preconception that the attack would come into Kuwait only. The forces arrayed along the coast to defend against an amphibious assault and the forces dug in and defending the Kuwait-Saudi border support this conclusion. Some forces were defending west of the Wadi al-Batin but they had a definite end point (Map 1, Appendix A). The operational reserves of the Republican

Guards and other heavy divisions appeared to be in position to conduct an operational counterattack against any attack along the Wadi or against Kuwait City.

The CENTCOM planners built the plan to support this preconception. Initially, the Marines, the XVIII Corps, and some of the Arab forces were arrayed in defensive positions east of the Wadi al-Batin. The Syrian forces were west of the Wadi but there was some question whether those forces or the Egyptians would participate in the ground offensive.⁵⁷ As the VII Corps arrived, they assumed defensive positions near the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) to the east of the Wadi. The logistics build up continued in the vicinity of the KKMC. Maps 2 and 3 in Appendix A show the positioning of forces prior to Desert Storm.

The planners had the basis for a deception operation that would feed the enemy preconceptions by portraying a course of action that was feasible, believable, and fully in consonance with the Iraqi defense. In the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi army had experienced mostly set piece battle against massive Iranian infantry attacks. The disposition of the coalition forces fit their method of defense and therefore reinforced their prior experience.⁵⁸

The coalition attack appeared to be coming from both the sea and the ground east of the Wadi al-Batin. To promote the deception of the amphibious assault, the Marines conducted a series of well publicized rehearsals dubbed "Operation Imminent Thunder". General Schwarzkopf noted that "Imminent Thunder" was designed to focus Saddam

Hussein on the amphibious operation and keep his forces concentrated to defend against it.⁵⁹

When the air war began on 16 January 1991, one of the objectives of the air campaign was to blind the Iraqi intelligence gathering capability. This included first establishing uncontested air superiority so that the Iraqi air forces could not see what was happening on the other side of the border.⁶⁰ However, certain communications nodes and intelligence capabilities were not destroyed so that the Iraqi intelligence could still see what the coalition wanted them to see.⁶¹ In addition, coalition counterintelligence teams worked in the Hafir al-Batin region to feed the deception story to suspected Iraqi human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors.⁶² As the ground campaign approached, the air campaign targeting supported the deception by concentrating on the targets in the areas of the attack but doing it in such a way so as not to give an indication of the location of the main attack.⁶³

The operational planners determined that it would take fourteen days to move the VII and XVIII Corps to their actual attack positions west of the Wadi al-Batin. Therefore, these forces remained in the deception positions until the air campaign had effectively knocked out the Iraqi capability to see anything other than what the deception plan gave them (see map 4 in Appendix A). A risk was accepted in the building of the forward logistic base C (see map 5 in Appendix A) because the logistic troops were temporarily the only forces west of the Wadi and subject to an Iraqi preemptive attack such as that at Khafji.⁶⁴

As the two main attack forces vacated their positions beginning in early February, they left behind their intelligence collection assets as well as their battlefield deception units. Beginning on 13 February, these deception units, along with the First Cavalry Division, the CENTCOM reserve, moved forward to portray that the two corps were remaining in place and preparing for offensive operations. The units focused on the Iraqi Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and HUMINT capabilities since the Image Intelligence (IMINT) capability no longer existed.⁶⁵

To the west, the combat units of the two corps were not allowed to approach within a set distance of the border so as not to be seen or reported by any Iraqi units in the area. This caused concern on the part of commanders who wanted to begin conducting reconnaissance. Again, the CENTCOM command accepted some risk in not allowing this and provided front line intelligence to the units from the CENTCOM level.⁶⁶

All of these actions near the Wadi al-Batin demonstrate the deception maxim from FM 90-2 of "Jone's Dilemma". This maxim shows that deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels of information available increases. It goes on to state that the greater the number of controlled channels, the greater the likelihood the deception will be believed.⁶⁷ The CENTCOM plan provided for certain Iraqi collectors to remain in operation and the rest to be destroyed. The plan provided for those remaining collectors to be shown a false story by the deception units. Using signal emulators, they provided the Iraqi SIGINT collectors indicators that the VII and XVIII corps

were still in place near the Wadi al-Batin and preparing to attack.⁶⁸ Other collectors, especially the HUMINT collectors, were also fed a controlled story. This appears to be a classic example of the Jone's Dilemma maxim.

On 17 February, the cavalry squadron of the First Cavalry Division crossed the border in the Wadi al-Batin. This was followed on 20 February by a brigade sized attack into the Wadi to portray a reconnaissance in force in the area of the notional main attack.⁶⁹ On 22 February, the First and Second Marine Divisions conducted reconnaissance in force attacks across the border to identify crossing sites and create confusion in the Iraqi forces as to the location of the main attack.⁷⁰

The Marines had the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat to support the amphibious feint. These were well covered by media pools.⁷¹ On the night of 23-24 February, the battleship MISSOURI fired on Faylaka Island to further the amphibious deception.⁷² Also on the morning of 24 February, Navy Seal teams went ashore near Mina Saud, south of Kuwait City, to set off explosives and simulate that an amphibious assault was under way.⁷³

The timing of the ground campaign was also designed to further the deception story. The intent was to portray the Marine attack as the main effort (see map 6 in Appendix A). The First Cavalry Division conducted another attack into the Wadi al-Batin on 24 February as the final act in the deception in that area.⁷⁴ A series of situations, including the success of the initial

attacks, convinced the CENTCOM commander to begin the main attack ahead of schedule on the afternoon of 24 February.

Deception is a very time sensitive operation. Once the main attack began in the west, the deception plan essentially came to an end although the Marines conducted another amphibious feint using a massive helicopter assault toward the Kuwait beach fifty hours into the ground campaign. This assault turned back upon receiving effective fire from shore. This final feint, however, was credited as having continued to freeze many Iraqi units in the notional amphibious assault area.⁷⁵

As can be seen from the complexity of the plan, integration and synchronization of the deception operation were critical to the success of the deception operation. Intelligence also played a key role in the deception operation. CENTCOM developed an intelligence collection plan that included the use of the latest high technology systems such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS). The plan also made great use of Special Operations Forces for targeting and vital combat intelligence on unit locations and dispositions.⁷⁶

The intelligence effort gave the commander the feedback he needed to gauge the effectiveness of the deception plan. The senior intelligence officer was able to conclude in late December 1990 that the Iraqi forces were fixed and would probably not redispense or reinforce in any significant manner. Further, the Iraqi military appeared fixated on the defense of Kuwait City and Basrah and so would not move forces or construct elaborate defenses west of the Wadi al-Batin.⁷⁷

Armed with this assessment, the deception planners could feel confident that the deception operation would succeed. As the ground campaign approached, the intelligence system was able to verify that the above predictions were accurate so the operational campaign could take place as planned.

The final cornerstone of deception operations, Operations Security (OPSEC), was significant in Desert Storm. The critical elements of information about the coalition forces to keep from the Iraqi intelligence system were the movement of the two corps from their notional attack positions to their actual attack positions. This move had to take place both day and night, through an area with possible Iraqi sympathizers, and under the scrutiny of the media. The next section of the monograph will analyze the implications of OPSEC and the media. The evidence suggests that the overall OPSEC performance of the Desert Storm units was good.

The test of any deception operation is whether or not it is successful. As noted at the beginning of this paper, General Schwarzkopf attributed part of the overall Desert Storm success to the deception plan. There are numerous documented indications that the Iraqi forces reacted to the deception operations. A few of these indications will serve to illustrate the success of the deception operation.

The major part of the deception, the amphibious feint, appears to have been totally accepted by the Iraqi forces. After the war, numerous examples were found that proved the Iraqi commanders considered the amphibious assault as

the most likely coalition plan.⁷⁸ In fact, U.S. Marines found an elaborate sand table in an Iraqi corps headquarters in Kuwait City that showed the forces arrayed to defend against the amphibious assault. The sand table showed what the Iraqi commanders believed the most likely amphibious assault locations. There were over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers dedicated to the coastal defense.⁷⁹ That these defenders were held in place and not used to reinforce Iraqi defenses to the west probably supports the conclusion of the effectiveness of the deception operation.

The deception operations in the area of the Wadi al-Batin also support the conclusion of the success of the deception. When the two corps attacked in the west, most of the forces had no defensive barriers to cross. The Iraqi forces they did encounter were still facing in their predisposed defensive alignments.⁸⁰ As predicted by the intelligence analysts, the Iraqi forces conducted no operational maneuver to react to the attack and only conducted limited tactical counterattacks throughout the theater of operations.⁸¹

The success of the deception operations by the deception units left behind at the Wadi al-Batin was shown in an interesting anecdote. An Egyptian commander positioned east of the Wadi complained that the Iraqi forces had reinforced significantly in his attack sector because of the deception cells operating in his area.⁸²

Similarly, the First Cavalry Division detected substantial reinforcement in the area of the Wadi after their first attack across the border on 17 February.⁸³

The deception plan was based on a potential course of action available to the commander which also illustrates the concept of deceptiveness from TRADOC Pam 525-XX. The deception course of action, sending the main attack through the Wadi al-Batin and conducting an amphibious assault, was a viable attack option throughout the campaign. The placement of logistics to support a potential attack in the center (log base A in map 5, Appendix A) gave the commander tremendous flexibility. The CENTCOM plan included provisions for changing to this course of action if the Iraqi forces had not reacted to the deception plan and had prepared extensive defenses to the west.⁸⁴ General Schwarzkopf acknowledged in his briefing that the Marines were capable of conducting an amphibious landing and would have been given the order if necessary. This deceptiveness in operations provided an element of operational flexibility fully in keeping with AirLand Battle doctrine.

The Desert Storm deception plan was successful. The framework from FM 90-2 was used effectively, as were the cornerstones of deception operations. All of the factors listed appear to have been considered in the deception planning with special emphasis on objective, feedback, coordination, timing, realism, enemy and friendly capabilities, forces and personnel, supervision, and means. The means used included deception units, actual forces, feints, demonstrations, and other means. The role of the media as a means will be investigated in the next section.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The war in the gulf was a media war. The major networks and Cable News Network were able to provide almost instantaneous coverage from some parts of the battle zone. Although television coverage was arguably the star of the media in the gulf, the war was also covered extensively by print Journalists. Central Command planned and executed a highly successful deception operation with the media present. The remaining question for this monograph, then, is if or how the media coverage promoted the deception plan.

In the theater of operations on 28 February, there were 1600 accredited Journalists covering the war.⁸⁵ Although an enormous number, not all were active Journalists because that number included technicians, drivers, and support personnel. However, compare that number to 461 Journalists in the European Theater of Operations during the invasion of Normandy, of which only 27 accompanied troops ashore in the first wave.⁸⁶ During the ground campaign in Desert Storm, there were 165 journalists and associated technicians in media pools with the military forces in the field.⁸⁷

The media were restricted to covering the war from the military pool system established by recommendations from the Sidle Commission following the invasion of Grenada. In addition, the Journalists were required to abide by a set of Department of Defense guidelines designed to safeguard coalition security interests. These guidelines are included in Appendix C. All reports were subject to military security review

to ensure there were no compromises of sensitive information. In addition, reporters were dependent on the military for transmitting their stories within the theater to the Joint Information Bureau. No independent transmission devices were allowed in the field.⁸⁸

The first consideration in the discussion of the media's role in the deception is whether the media was used as a serious source of intelligence inside the Iraqi command system. The next consideration is whether the coalition forces made a conscious effort to use the media and if so, how was the media used. Included in this discussion are OPSEC considerations and performance as well as the possible effects of the professional analysts. Finally, some conclusions will be made as to the usefulness of the media in selling the deception story.

First, did the Iraqi forces use the media as a source of intelligence? All of the evidence indicates that the Iraqi command did in fact use the media, especially television, as a source of intelligence. The Iraqi commanders were noted for using the media for frontline information during the Iran-Iraq war.⁸⁹ This predisposition more than likely carried into the gulf war especially since coverage was more readily available. At the highest levels of the Iraqi government, the foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, admitted that he watched CNN as a source of information.⁹⁰

The war saw an unprecedented use of the media for diplomatic dialogue.⁹¹ President Bush used television to address the Iraqi people on 16 September 1990. Iraq made numerous efforts to use the media for their propaganda. Probably the best

example of these efforts was the tape of Saddam Hussein with British hostages in late August. The results of that tape were probably not what Hussein intended, but it does illustrate the point that Hussein used the television medium for his own purposes. That Peter Arnett of CNN was allowed to remain in and report from Baghdad throughout the war shows the importance that Hussein placed on television and CNN especially.⁹²

The television networks, especially CNN, appeared to be important to the Iraqi regime for their use in propaganda. The print media were also important but probably less so than television. AP and Reuters were allowed to stay in Baghdad to report.⁹³ The evidence suggests, however, that the print media were less used as an intelligence source by Saddam Hussein who was the decision maker. He does not read English and indications are that he had few western publications translated.⁹⁴ Print journalism most likely contributed to the noise level in the Iraqi intelligence system, but was not used extensively by Saddam Hussein as a basis for his decisions.

By the time of the ground invasion, the Iraqi intelligence systems were virtually blind. As noted in the previous section, some systems were still allowed to be in use near the Wadi al-Batin but were being shown a controlled picture. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that television and, to a lesser extent, print journalism were being used as a source of intelligence.

Because the Iraqi decision makers probably used the media as a source of intelligence, the coalition had a marked advantage if they had wanted to actively use the media to help confirm

the deception. However, it must be kept in mind that the military is prohibited by public law from using the public affairs program for anything other than providing information. The principles laid down by Department of Defense guidelines show that propaganda is prohibited.⁹⁵ The purpose of the program is to provide information so that the public may make their own informed judgement.⁹⁶ The principles also recognize the legitimate requirements to protect information from a security standpoint.

The principles of information make sense because historically, outright lying to the press, especially by the military, has rarely been successful. With that as the background, the evidence suggests positively that CENTCOM conducted no organized plan to use the press to further the deception story.⁹⁷ There were numerous reported incidents of officials, mostly in the Pentagon, who knowingly leaked inaccurate information. In all of the cases listed, the officials were seen by the press as acting in what they thought were the best interests of security and not as part of an organized program.⁹⁸

Because there was no apparent plan does not prevent members of the media from complaining that they believed they were used to further the deception story. A group of media executives complained in a letter to the Secretary of Defense that the military used the press to disseminate disinformation.⁹⁹ The concern stemmed from the media coverage of the amphibious training and the amphibious force in the gulf. General Schwarzkopf explained in his press conference of 27 February that the media had covered the Imminent Thunder

exercises extensively. He had directed the amphibious exercises beginning in early October so as to ensure that they got media coverage.¹⁰⁰ All of that coverage was attributed as being helpful in focusing Saddam Hussein on the amphibious threat. The General did add, however, that the amphibious capability provided a viable military option, intimating that the military had not lied about an amphibious assault but had provided information and let the press speculate as to their uses.¹⁰¹

The press coverage of the amphibious assault capability illustrates two maxims of deception. The first is the already mentioned Magruder's Principles of the exploitation of perceptions. The coverage of the amphibious training during Imminent Thunder as well as the well publicized visit of General Schwarzkopf to the Marines to discuss amphibious operations on 14 December and again on 15 February, all served to further the belief that the amphibious operation would take place as Saddam Hussein believed it would.¹⁰²

The types of deception available, another of the maxims, are also shown by this example. There are two types, A-ambiguity and M-misdirection deception.¹⁰³ The coverage of the amphibious capability probably influenced Saddam to believe his notional view of the coalition strategy (ambiguity deception). It also apparently helped convince the Iraqi command that a part of the coalition assault would come from the sea against Kuwait City (misdirection). But, the military never lied about an amphibious assault. All that was ever said by the military was that it was a capability and that it could be used. The public

(In this case, Saddam Hussein and his commanders) was left to make up their own mind.

The media focused on those things that helped the deception plan even though there was no organized plan for them to do so. The media recognized that the daily press briefings focused them on the topics that the military wanted them to cover. Specifically, the briefings provided information about the amphibious training and the media coverage and speculation did the rest.¹⁰⁴ The nature of Marine public relations also helped gain press coverage for the amphibious exercises. The Marines are aggressive at telling their story and were perceived by the media as being the most open and available for coverage.¹⁰⁵

Before leaving the subject of the amphibious coverage, the complaint of the media executives should be addressed. Their complaint has been largely dismissed by journalists themselves. One journalist pointed out that he knew the amphibious assault was not going to happen when the Navy allowed Sam Donaldson to interview the amphibious task force commander.¹⁰⁶ A sampling of other journalists indicates that most expect that the military will not tell them the actual plans. Although this often leads to friction, it is not unhealthy and should be considered a normal part of the media-military relationship.¹⁰⁷ Jonathan Alter of Newsweek summed it up best when he said in an article: "Using the media to confuse the enemy is part of fighting a war."¹⁰⁸

Providing information on specific capabilities and letting the media cover and speculate appears to be a good method for the deception planner. It meets the DOD guidelines of

information. The planner must ensure that OPSEC requirements are considered when showing capabilities to the enemy.

The media can help or hurt a deception effort in the area of Operations Security (OPSEC). The overall OPSEC for Desert Storm appears to have been good. However, this deserves a more detailed discussion.

The press pool and review system contributed to the OPSEC effort. The pools could only go where they were escorted and their reports had to be reviewed. The review system in place was different from the censorship system of World War II. In WWII, the reporter filed the story and the censor cut out any offending portions. During Desert Storm, the reviewer and the reporter mutually agreed on what should be deleted from a report. The review system also provided for higher level review if the field representative and the journalist could not agree.¹⁰⁹ Of the pool reports filed, 29% had changes made during the review process.¹¹⁰ And of all 1351 filed, only five had to go to the Pentagon for higher level review and only one of those was changed with mutual consent of the editors.¹¹¹

Although a substantial number of reports were changed due to review, a number still slipped through. An example shows the serious consequences that could have resulted. One reported incident gave the name of a Saudi town in connection with a unit story. A quick look at a map by a Los Angeles Times reporter showed him the plan of attack at least a week before the ground campaign began.¹¹² The implications of such disclosures for deception are that an alert enemy

can piece together the plan as many reporters did. However, another maxim of deception, the limits on human information processing, probably came into play in the gulf war.

The maxim of human information processing takes two forms, the law of small numbers and the susceptibility to conditioning.¹¹³ The Iraqi command was probably influenced the most by the susceptibility to conditioning. This theory is based on the frequent inability of targets to detect small changes in indicators over time. Because there were only a few reports in the media that showed changed locations (most locations given were in connection with KKM which served to verify the Iraqi preconception), and because the media was still largely focused on the amphibious forces, the Iraqi intelligence system may have discounted the changed locations if they even read those few reports that slipped through the review.

The media, for the most part, showed great restraint in reporting information that would have given the plan away. The Washington Post Writers Group, writing after the war, noted that they and others had figured out the plan based on the move to the west but voluntarily withheld the information from their reports.¹¹⁴ Tony Clifton of Newsweek gives another example of press self censorship. He withheld one of his associates stories from publication because it told of the move to the west of the Wadi al-Batin and probable coalition objectives deep inside Iraq.¹¹⁵ These examples are a positive reflection on the media and show their willingness to protect critical information voluntarily.

Not all of the Journalists remained with the pools or stayed within the DOD security guidelines. For example, one reporter worked free lance in Hafir al-Batin using the phone system to fax his stories to the states. He reported activities of British commandos operating in Iraq that could have had serious consequences.¹¹⁶ However, since he worked for the Minneapolis Star Tribune, his audience was probably fairly limited. Other Journalists attempted to work around the guidelines by changing location names in their stories.¹¹⁷ These tricks were, for the most part, simplistic and easy to figure out.

Another problem for deception planners when considering the media is equal coverage to all units. If the media coverage has been fairly uniform for all units and then a major unit becomes conspicuous by its absence from the battlefield; this can raise questions on the enemy side. During Desert Storm, units of the VII Corps were covered during deployment but then were conspicuous by their absence from the press. This led some Journalists to question why the units were not being covered and what they were doing.¹¹⁸ When questioned by reporters about these units, the Joint Information Bureau reported that the units were repositioning and not ready to accept pools.¹¹⁹ If reported, this could have been a serious OPSEC slip. However, on 12 February a report circulated that said more pools were being established in order to cover all of the units involved. It specifically noted two divisions in the VII Corps which up to then had been absent from reports. It also mentioned that pools were forming for the Marine forces

afloat.¹²⁰ When considering deception integration and synchronization, planners have to ensure that the public affairs plan is consistent with the deception plan.

The media have complained that the review process was too slow and that the transmission of reports was unnecessarily delayed. This complaint has bearing on the future coverage of wars and could impact on deception efforts of the future because the media will be more insistent on using their own state of the art transmission equipment. One incident reported by the media executives dealt with the First Cavalry Division. A reporter was with the First Cavalry during the attacks into the Wadi al-Batin but his reports were delayed in transmission until after the ground war began.¹²¹ It is unclear whether this was a deliberate effort to hold the news or not. The First Cavalry was deeply involved in the deception effort near the Wadi.

The effect of instantaneous reports without review from the field is probably not yet fully understood. However, two examples show the problems encountered and, by inference, the challenges for future deception planners. The best example of the television war and the possible benefits for the enemy is the live Scud reports. Cameramen were poised on hotels to capture pictures of incoming Scud missiles. These pictures could be used by Iraqi forces for future targeting and battle damage assessment so the press stopped.¹²²

The second example took place after the air war began. Navy carrier pilots were interviewed live after a mission in which they reported that

Iraqi forces on Maridum Island were spelling "SOS". When U.S. forces went back later to try to capture the Iraqi troops, they were gone.¹²³ The supposition here is that the Iraqi troops were gathered in by their own security forces after the report on CNN. Although it is not known what happened to the Iraqi soldiers, this incident does show the difficulty with reporting live from the battlefield.

However, the live television reports from Baghdad provided some intelligence, especially battle damage assessment, to the U.S. forces.¹²⁴ The author of this paper commanded the 3rd Battalion 67th Armored Regiment of the Tiger Brigade (1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division) in the gulf war and came to rely on CNN and the British Broadcasting Company as the best source of near real time situation reports available prior to the start of the ground campaign.

A final area of consideration with the media and the deception plan is the effect of the military analysts. The prime time professional expert analyzing possible operations on television is a rather recent phenomenon. During the War in the Falklands, "battalions of retired admirals and generals" appeared on television and in the press to give their thoughts and speculations.¹²⁵ There was widespread concern in the British military that these experts would give away potential battle plans with no thought for operational security. The whole affair brings to light a challenge for the operational deception planner.

During the preparation for Desert Storm, the television networks and the press conducted extensive analysis of the coalition operations.

Their speculations ranged from quality of equipment to relative strengths of the adversaries to the options available for the attack. Many of the speculations, especially about Iraqi capabilities and the battle worthiness of U.S. equipment, were wide of the mark in the final analysis.¹²⁶ This paper is only concerned with those speculations about the ground campaign plan and the possible impact they had on the deception operation.

Members of the CENTCOM staff were concerned that the media would correctly guess the coalition ground campaign.¹²⁷ Their concern was that the Iraqi command would piece together the analyst reports with other indicators that might be available and change their plan of defense.

A survey shows that numerous television analysts correctly speculated on the coalition plan. One of the first was on the ABC Television program Nightline on 3 October 1990.¹²⁸ The analysts on that night demonstrated a wargame they had developed. They accurately predicted the forces required and the campaign plan. Their game had the Marines landing although they did not agree on that aspect of the analysis.

As the ground campaign approached, the number of commentators predicting the coalition plan increased significantly. Some of the journalists that had figured out the plan, urged restraint on their colleagues. Some networks and major newspapers voluntarily withheld their speculation as to the campaign plan because they believed that they had properly figured it out. They felt that it would have been irresponsible to report on the campaign plan in light of that knowledge.¹²⁹ But

still, many others did speculate in print and on television.¹³⁰

There is no hard data to support any conclusions about the effect of this speculation at this time. However, deception theory and knowledge of Saddam Hussein does suggest that the expert commentators and their speculations had little or no effect on Iraqi decisions, especially when one remembers the results of the ground campaign.

The first reason to suspect that the analysts had little effect is the nature of the Iraqi leader. In his country, he controls the media tightly for his own purpose. As already noted, he used the media, especially CNN, to try to influence the behavior of his enemies. He is also not a serious student of history or modern diplomacy. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that he would consider any analyst on a U.S. television network to be as controlled as his own.¹³¹ A similar conclusion was made about the Argentine government and the British expert analysts in the Falklands War.¹³²

The second reason to believe that the expert commentator had little effect comes from deception theory from FM 90-2. Magruder's Principles of the exploitation of preconceptions, the Limitations to Human Processing (especially the susceptibility to conditioning), and the Types of Deception probably all come into play. The hard news that was shown in the media, especially the amphibious exercises, supported the preconceptions of Saddam Hussein and his commanders. The other intelligence sources available were, for the most part, also supporting the preconception. The number of media

predictions available to Saddam Hussein is unknown. If he looked at a great many, which is doubtful, there were slight differences in all of the speculative plans. Theory suggests that he would have been most susceptible to believing only those that fit his beliefs and rejecting the correct ones.

It will probably be many years, if ever, before the above theories can be supported with evidence. It will require in depth interviews with Saddam Hussein or his close associates before any final conclusions can be drawn.

All future wars will most likely have armies of expert commentators. Jonathan Alter of Newsweek notes that "speculation is half the fun of covering one [a war]."133 The theory suggests that the deception planner does not have to worry unduly about the expert commentator if the deception operation is properly designed.

The media proved to be a source of intelligence to the Iraqi command. As the Iraqi intelligence system was shut down by the air campaign, the media, especially CNN, probably gained more importance. The reports in the media supported the preconception of the Iraqi command and probably served to reinforce the deception story.

Media coverage was useful in furthering the deception effort. The media aided the deception plan without an organized plan on their part or by CENTCOM. There were some problems with OPSEC violations getting past the security review system but those instances were amazingly low.

The lesson that can be taken from the operational deception plan and the media is that a

properly conceived operation will succeed despite media coverage. The planner must base the deception operation on doctrine. The design must account for all of the factors, maxims, and cornerstones. The planner must pay particular attention to the OPSEC requirements especially when considering the media that will be trying to cover the story. The media plan must then be based on the Principles of Information and the public affairs coordinator must be brought in with the operational planner to synchronize the operation. If all of these things are considered, the deception operation will have a high probability of success.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The operational deception plan for Operation Desert Storm was successful. The Iraqi forces remained poised for an attack that never came and were quickly overrun from the flank. Air superiority was critical to the success of both the deception effort and the overall speed of the ground campaign. AirLand Battle doctrine proved effective in the prosecution of the war.

After the war, much was made of the deception operation in the press, especially after General Schwarzkopf highlighted it in his press conference.¹³⁴ Some analysts, however, discounted the deception operation for various reasons. Dunnigan and Bay, authors of How to Make War, wrote in their book on Desert Storm that the CENTCOM commander made more of the deception operation than it was.¹³⁵ But then they also stated that the feints in the Wadi and from the sea were effective in keeping the Iraqi forces

focused in those directions! It would seem they did not understand either deception doctrine or this deception operation.

An independent researcher wrote that he believed that the deception operation came about because General Schwarzkopf is reportedly an amateur magician and therefore should believe in the theory of "outs".¹³⁶ This theory is analogous to the deceptiveness concept of having more than one course of action available in case the main course of action (trick for a magician) cannot be executed. His explanation ignores the doctrinal foundation for deception and focuses instead only on the commander.

The operational deception plan for Desert Storm did not come about through luck or a magician's trick. Rather, the deception plan was grounded in AirLand Battle doctrine. The commander and his staff needed a combat multiplier to help cope with the force ratios they were facing. Deception operations have traditionally filled this role. Michael Handel noted that when faced with superior numbers, the U.S. military historically turned to deception as another means of setting conditions for success on the battlefield.¹³⁷ Future campaign planners should consider deception in all operations regardless of the force ratios because it does act as a valuable combat multiplier.

The Desert Storm campaign plan was based on AirLand Battle doctrine from FM 100-5 and the deception operation was well grounded in theory and the doctrine of FM 90-2. The planners apparently considered the cornerstones of deception in the campaign design. The framework

was used to communicate the deception plan and all of the factors necessary for a successful deception were present in the plan. The deceptiveness concept was shown to be another tool for use by the commander in his campaign design. Actual forces were allocated against the deception operation as were specialized deception units. The air campaign also supported the operation. In sum, the success of the deception operation showed the effects of the tenets of AirLand Battle - Agility, Initiative, Depth, and, most importantly, Synchronization.

The operational level planner should study the deception operation from Desert Storm. In future wars, the conditions will most likely be different and the enemy may not be as predictable. In addition, the planner may have to plan the deception under the threat of overhead platforms that did not play a part in the gulf war. However, if the planner bases the deception on doctrine, it can still be as successful.

The future planner will almost surely have to contend with different rules for the media. Media guidelines for future wars will be debated for years to come. The media executives have developed their own guidelines for consideration which are included in Appendix D. These guidelines contain three areas of concern for the operational planner.

First, the pool system was uniformly unpopular and will probably be significantly modified. This means that the OPSEC plan has to take into consideration the number of journalists roaming free trying to develop stories. The pool system has merits for OPSEC as well as coping with

the numbers of journalists in a war zone. Modifications to the pool system to allow for more pools and greater access to units as well as better escorts may be required. If the pool system is to remain in effect throughout a future conflict, the military must act now to train and equip pool escorts.

Second, media executives reject any system of security review. They prefer to let the journalist file the report based on security guidelines and what the journalist believes is sensitive. This is the most serious threat to OPSEC and any deception plan. Journalists should be required to submit to review at least in the period prior to ground operations since this is the critical time for setting conditions for success. As shown in Desert Storm, 29% of the reports filed needed some changes.¹³⁸ It would pose an unacceptably high level of risk to an operational campaign and a deception plan to have that many reports with OPSEC violations. As the ground campaign begins, rules of review could be relaxed to promote faster reports from the field since battlefield information is more time sensitive and of less value to enemy intelligence.

Surveys taken during and after the war showed that the American people believed that the press review system in the gulf was about right. They believed that the review system protected the military need for secrecy but also provided enough information to keep the people informed.¹³⁹ The American people understand the need for press review from the battlefield. Without taking away from the professionalism or patriotism of journalists, they must also understand the

legitimate needs for review. The problem is that the journalist just may not know what information would be helpful to the enemy.¹⁴⁰ The military must conduct the review quickly and fairly, without trying to use the review system to cover mistakes.

Finally, the media executives expect the military to provide a reliable communications system to get reports from the reporter to the editors. This did not occur consistently in Desert Storm.¹⁴¹ Therefore, the media executives want reporters to be able to use their own transmission devices for filing reports. However, without review and with instantaneous communications available, the journalist has the potential to become a major source of intelligence for the enemy. The Department of Defense guidelines should continue to restrict independent transmission devices from the field.

The military needs to build a reliable and fast system for reporters to file their reports from the field if independent transmitters are to remain banned. The British system developed after the Falklands War may be worth considering. This system provides a central transmission station with major units (the division in Desert Storm) for the journalists in the field. The journalist reviews the report jointly with the military at this site prior to sending the report to the editor.¹⁴² The system appears to meet the needs of both the journalists and the military. However, this system requires money and manpower, both of which are becoming more scarce. Regardless of the system agreed upon, the deception planner must be aware of the rules

regarding independent transmitters for Journalists.

Whatever the press guidelines of the future, the operational planner must be aware of the media in the design of the deception operation. The media will not go away and so must be considered. Arthur Lubow wrote that: "In modern war, reporters must be permitted at the front, and they must submit to sensible censorship. Mutual mistrust is part of the shared heritage of soldiers and journalists in time of war. So is mutual accomodation."¹⁴³ In Operation Desert Storm, the press would appear to have accomodated the deception plan and so, in a small way, helped the coalition win their decisive battle.


The deception operation in Operation Desert Storm showed what can be done. Doctrine, training, and force structure should focus on building and refining deception capabilities. The doctrine should take into account the effects of the media in deception operations. The Joint Publications and the Army doctrinal manuals should reflect this as well as continue to place emphasis on deception theory and techniques. Commanders in the field must train using deception in their operations. As resources continue to dwindle, the military must not lose sight of deception as a combat multiplier for future operations.

APPENDIX A

OPERATIONAL MAPS


- MAP 1. Iraqi Brigades in KTO Start of Ground Offensive, 24 Feb. 1991.
- MAP 2. November Force Locations.
- MAP 3. Repositioning.
- MAP 4. Movement: VII & XVIII Corps.
- MAP 5. Preposition: Theater Reserve and Corps Stocks.
- MAP 6. Timing of the Attack.

Source: Colonel Joseph Purvis, "Desert Storm Operational Plan," School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, 30 Sept. 1991.




IRAQI BDES IN KTO
START OF GROUND OFFENSIVE
24 FEBRUARY 1991 (C+201)

NOVEMBER FORCE LOCATIONS




REPOSITIONING



• RIYADII

MOVEMENT VII & XVIII CORPS




POINTS:

MUST MOVE XVIII AND VII CORPS
DURING 14 DAY PERIOD

MUST BE PRECISELY EXECUTED (CROSSING OF CORPS)

PREPOSITION

(THEATER RESERVE AND CORPS STOCKS)



POINTS:

- 4 THEATER LOG BASES
- CLASSES I, III, V, AND WATER
- LB CHARLIE ON ORDER
- LB DELTA PREFERRED CLASS V
- NLT 15 JAN 91

APPENDIX B GROUND FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE

U.S. Forces

I Marine Expeditionary Force	
1st Mar Div	4th MEB
2nd Mar Div	5th MEB
1st (Tiger) Bde, 2AD	
VII Corps	
1st ID (Mech)	1st Cav Div
1st AR Div	2nd ACR
3rd AR Div	
XVIII Abn Corps	
24th ID (Mech)	3rd ACR
82nd Abn Div	
101st AA Div	
Combat Support:	
Seven FA Brigades	11th Avn Bde
6-27 FA (MLRS/ATCMS)	12th Avn Bde

Britain

1st AR Div

Royal Saudi Land Forces

8th Mech Bde
10th Mech Bde
20th Mech Bde
4th AR Bde

Saudi National Guard

2nd Bde

Kuwait

35th Mech Bde
INF Bde

Senegal

INF Regt

France

6th Lt AR Div

Egypt

3rd Mech Div
4th AR Div
Ranger Regt

Syria

9th AR Div
SF Regt

Morocco

INF Regt

PSF

4 (+) BNs

Source: Colonel Joseph Purvis, "Desert Storm Operational Plan," School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 30 Sept. 1991.

APPENDIX C

SECURITY GROUND RULES FOR JOURNALISTS

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.

1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment or supplies (for example, artillery, tanks, radar, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

3. Information or photography, including aerial and satellite pictures, that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined, "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwait border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless DoD has publicly acknowledged participation by that country.

4. Rules of engagement details.

5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, method, and results.

6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security and lives. This would include designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than land or sea based.

8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, and security measures.

9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

10. Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air ops angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

12. Information on the operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

Source: "Ground Rules," Defense, May-Jun. 1991, p. 12.

APPENDIX D

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

We believe these are the principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage of the United States military in combat:

1. Independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. The use of pools should be limited to the kind envisioned by the Sidle Commission. Pools are meant to bring a representative group of journalists along with the first elements of any major U.S. military operation. These pools should last no longer than the very first stages of a deployment -- the initial 24 hours to 36 hours -- and should be disbanded rapidly in favor of independent coverage. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. forces.
3. Some pools may be appropriate for events in places where open coverage is physically impossible. But the existence of such special-purpose pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage. If news organizations are able to cover pooled events independently, they may do so.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security guidelines that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the guidelines can result in suspension of credentials or revocation of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. News material -- words and pictures -- will not be subject to prior military security review.
8. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. Field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible.
9. The military will supply PAOs with timely, secure, compatible transmission facilities for pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available and will not be prevented from doing so. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations.

10. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

Source: Roone Arledge, et. al., Letter to The Honorable Dick Cheney, 24 Jun. 1991.

NOTES

- 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), p. 66.
- 2 Paul C. Jussel, "Corps Tactical Deceptions: Who's Fooling Whom," Monograph, SAMS First Term AY 90-91, pp. 6-7. Major Jussel synthesized the works of Jomini and Clausewitz in regard to deception.
- 3 Jussel. p. 7.
- 4 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p. 210.
- 5 "Central Command Briefing: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 27 Feb. 1991," Military Review, Sept. 91, p. 97. Hereafter referred to as "Central Command Briefing."
- 6 This study is limited to the operational level of warfare. Examples of tactical deception by subordinate units will be used to show the operational plan. Each tactical level unit had supporting deception plans which deserve independent study. Strategic deception, if there was a plan in existence, will be considered only as it may apply to the operational level plan.
- 7 Field Manual 90-2, Battlefield Deception (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988), p. G-8.
- 8 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Washington D.C.: G.P.O., 11 November 1991), p. 31.
- 9 Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986), p. 53.
- 10 FM 100-5, p. 53.
- 11 Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare (Devon, Great Britain: David & Charles, 1987), pp. 124-125.
- 12 FM 90-2, p. 1-3. These maxims are: Magruder's principles -- the exploitation of perceptions, Limitations to human information processing, Cry-Wolf, Jones' dilemma, A choice among types of deception, Axelrod's contribution: the husbanding of assets, A sequencing rule, The importance of feedback, The Monkey's Paw, and Care in the design of planned placement of deceptive material.
- 13 FM 90-2, pp. 1-30 to 1-31.
- 14 FM 90-2, p. 1-31.
- 15 FM 90-2, p. 1-32.
- 16 FM 90-2, pp. 1-33 to 1-35.

- 17 FM 90-2, pp. 1-37 to 1-38.
- 18 T.L. Cubbage II, "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process," in Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p. 115.
- 19 Dewar, p. 70.
- 20 "Cover and Deception Report in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), Cover and Deception Synopsis of History," in Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, Vol. 15 in Covert Warfare, ed. Harold C. Deutsch (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), Document No. 1, p. 6. This volume contains recently declassified reports from the Allied Headquarters.
- 21 Cubbage, pp. 120-122.
- 22 "Cover and Deception Report in ETO," p. 6.
- 23 Michael Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 381.
- 24 "Cover and Deception Report in ETO," pp. 7-8.
- 25 "Cover and Deception Definition and Procedure," in Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion (See note 20), Document No. 4, pp. 1-2.
- 26 Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 480, assignment of soldiers, and p. 604, 'leaks' about FUSAG.
- 27 Handel, p. 382.
- 28 "Cover and Deception Report in ETO," p. 8.
- 29 "Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report, Enemy Reactions to Plan Fortitude, dated 25 May 1945," in Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion (See note 20), Document 17, Exhibit No. 6, "UKW Daily Situation Report, dated 26 June 1944," and Exhibit No. 7, "Weekly Situation Report by C-in-C West for the Period from 19 June to 25 June 1944 to OKH and Others, dated 27 June 1944."
- 30 "Deception," The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II, 1980, p. 134.
- 31 "Appendix No. 1 to Informal Report," Exhibit No. 3, "Survey of the British Empire No. 29, dated 15 May 1944," p. 2. This document shows that the German intelligence used press reports as a source for independent confirmation of a report of an agent.

32 Giles Perrault, The Secret of D-Day (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1964), p. 180. The author noted how Field Marshal Rundstedt listened to the BBC to get information about other theaters of war because the German High Command provided it only on a need to know basis. The Order of Principle came about after officers with the plan for the invasion of France strayed into Belgian territory and were captured in 1940.

33 FM 90-2, p. 2-1.

34 FM 90-2, p. 7-4.

35 Handel, p. 312.

36 Personal interview with Bob Spear, 13 Nov. 1991. Mr. Spear is the proponent for deception in the Combined Arms Combat Developments Integration Directorate at Ft Leavenworth. See also Jussell, pp. 20-26.

37 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-XX, Deceptiveness in Airland Operations (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 13 Sept. 1991), p. 7.

38 TRADOC Pam 525-XX, p. 7.

39 U.S. President, "The Deployment of US Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 8 Aug. 1991," in Military Review, Sept. 1991, p. 82.

40 Personal interview with Colonel Joseph H. Purvis, 29 Sept. 1991. COL Purvis was the chief of the special plans cell for the J-5, CENTCOM. He is a graduate of the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship and had three graduates of the Advanced Military Studies Program working in his cell. For a further discussion of the special planning cell, see: The Award-Winning Staff of U.S. News & World Report, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House, 1992), pp. 164-166.

41 U.S. President, "Address to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 16 Sept. 1991," in Presidential Documents, Vol. 26, No. 38, 24 Sept. 1990, pp. 1389-1390.

42 Interview with COL Purvis.

43 "Central Command Briefing," p. 96.

44 The Award-Winning Staff of U.S. News & World Report, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 170. Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf both recognized from intelligence reports that the Iraqi commanders seemed to be preoccupied with an attack from the sea.

45 Interview with COL Purvis.

46 Gary P. Melton, "XVIII Airborne Corps Desert Deception," Military Intelligence, Oct.-Dec. 1991, p. 44.

47 Interview with COL Purvis.

48 Interview with COL Purvis.

- 49 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 50 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 51 David Zucchini, "U.S. Desert Strategy Is One for the Books," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 Mar. 1991, Sec. C, p. 4.
- 52 "Central Command Briefing," p. 97.
- 53 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Iran-Iraq War, Vol II of The Lessons of Modern War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 44.
- 54 Cordesman, p. 80.
- 55 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 56 FM 90-2, p. 1-3.
- 57 James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992), p. 59.
- 58 Barton Gellman, "Allies Prevented War of Attrition With Deception," The Washington Post, 28 Feb. 1991, p. 3.
- 59 "Central Command Briefing," p. 97; Triumph Without Victory, p. 170, gives a more detailed discussion of how the amphibious training operations were directed by General Schwarzkopf.
- 60 John M. Broder, "Schwarzkopf's War Plan Based on Deception," Los Angeles Times, 28 Feb. 1991, Sec. A, p. 18.
- 61 Tim Weiner, "Deception, Decoys Keys to Secret War," Virginia Pilot and Ledger Star, 14 Jul. 1991, Sec. A, p. 10.
- 62 Melton, p. 44.
- 63 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 64 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 65 Melton, p. 44.
- 66 Sean D. Naylor, "Risky Business," Army Times, 19 Aug. 1991, p. 27.
- 67 FM 90-2, p. 1-9.
- 68 Melton, p. 45; William Branigin, "For 1st Cavalry Tankers, War Was A Letdown," The Washington Post, 3 Mar. 1991, Sec. A, p. 32.
- 69 J. Paul Scicchitano, "Night Strikes: The Secret War of the 1st Cavalry Division," Army Times, 23 Sept. 1991, p. 15.
- 70 "Victory at Sea," All Hands, Special Issue Number 892, p. 22.
- 71 R. W. Apple, Jr., "Pentagon Moves to Widen Reporters' Access to Gulf Ground Units," New York Times, 13 Feb. 1991, p. 15.

- 72 "Victory at Sea," p. 23.
- 73 U.S. Special Operations Command, "Desert Storm After Action Briefing," 4 Feb. 1992.
- 74 Scicchitano, p. 16.
- 75 "Victory at Sea," p. 23
- 76 Douglas Waller, "Desert Storm's Secret Warriors," Newsweek, 17 Jun. 1991, pp. 21-23.
- 77 John F. Stewart, Operation Desert Storm: The Military Intelligence Story (Riyadh: Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, Apr. 1991), p. 25.
- 78 Murray Hammick, "Iraqi Obstacles and Defensive Positions," International Defense Review, Sept. 1991, p. 989.
- 79 "Victory at Sea," p. 24.
- 80 "Central Command Briefing," p. 97.
- 81 Stewart p 25
- 82 "Ruses Worked 'Incredibly Well,'" Kansas City Star, 4 Mar. 1991, Sec. C, p. 3.
- 83 Triumph Without Victory, pp. 284-285.
- 84 Interview with COL Purvis.
- 85 Winant Sidle, "A Battle Behind the Scenes," Military Review, Sept. 1991, p. 57.
- 86 Sidle, p. 58.
- 87 Brent Baker, "Desert Shield/Storm: The War of Words and Images," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1991, p. 59.
- 88 Baker, p. 60.
- 89 Cordesman, p. 80.
- 90 "The Voice of Baghdad," The Economist, 19-25 Jan. 1991, p. 26.
- 91 Baker, p. 61.
- 92 Jeff Kamen, "CNN's Breakthrough in Baghdad: Live by Satellite (Censored)," Washington Journalism Review, Mar. 1991, p. 26.
- 93 Howard Kurtz, "Media Dilemma: Breaking News, Iraqi Control," The Washington Post, 14 Feb. 1991, Sec. A, p. 1.
- 94 Personal Interview with Tony Clifton, 6 Jan. 1991. As a Newsweek reporter for many years, Mr. Clifton has spent much of his career covering events in the Middle East. He interviewed Saddam Hussein for his magazine during the Iran-Iraq war.
- 95 Department of Defense, Principles of Information (Washington D.C.: GPO, n.d.), p. 1.

96 Eric R. Colson, CW03, "The Media as a Force Multiplier?," Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1991, p. 50.

97 Thomas B. Rosenstiel, "Pentagon Shows Itself Adept at Art of Deception," Los Angeles Times, 2 Mar. 1991, Sec. A, p. 10; Interview with COL Purvis. As the CENTCOM J-5 planner, COL Purvis knew of no organized plan to use the press for deception.

98 Rosenstiel, p. A-10.

99 Roone Arledge et. al., Letter to The Honorable Dick Cheney, 24 Jun. 1991, p. 9. The letter was signed by sixteen media executives. They were: Roone Arledge, ABC News, Louis D. Boccardi, AP, Peter S. Pritchard, USA Today, Katharine Graham, The Washington Post Co., Peter Kahn, The Wall Street Journal, Jason McManus, Time Warner, Inc., Eric Ober, CBS News, Arnold Rosenfeld, Cox Newspapers, Richard M. Smith, Newsweek, Inc., James K. Batten, Knight-Ridder, Inc., Max Frankel, The New York Times, Michael G. Gartner, NBC News, Tom Johnson, CNN, David Laventhol, Los Angeles Times, Donald Newhouse, Star-Ledger, Burl Osborne, The Dallas Morning News, and Al Rossiter Jr. UPI.

100 Triumph Without Victory, p. 170.

101 "Central Command Briefing," p. 102.

102 Walter S. Mossberg, "U.S. Used Press as Weapon," Wall Street Journal, 28 Feb. 1991, p. 31; Molly Moore, "Marines Head for the Front," The Washington Post, 16 Feb. 1991, Sec. A, p. 1.

103 FM 90-2, pp. 1-9 to 1-11. There are two types of deception listed. Ambiguity deception (A) attempts to get the target to seize upon a particular notional world view as correct. Misdirection deception (M) reduces the uncertainty to make the target very certain, very determined, and very wrong.

104 John Pavlik and Seth Rachlin, "On Assignment: A Survey of Journalists Who Covered the War," in Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, ed. Craig LaMay, Martha FitzSimon, and Jeanne Sahadi (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991), p. 31.

105 Larry Grossman, "Newshounds and the Dogs of War," Government Executive, Sept. 1991, pp. 30-31. Mr. Grossman explains how the Marines were seen as the best in assisting the public with transmission of stories and providing access. A further example of the aggressiveness of the Marine public affairs program comes from a survey of The Washington Post for the period 13-27 February 1991. There was at least one feature article on Marines in every issue of the paper except for 20 Feb. The articles continued after the war on a similar basis.

106 "The First Casualty Revisited: A Roundtable Discussion," in Media at War (see note 104), p. 74.

107 "The First Casualty Revisited," p. 73; Interview with Tony Clifton.

108 Jonathan Alter, "Clippings from the Media War," Newsweek, 11 Mar. 1991, p. 52.

109 Pete Williams, "The Press and The Persian Gulf War," Parameters, Vol XXI Number 3, Autumn 1991, p. 6.

110 Pavlik, p. 29.

111 Williams, p. 6.

112 Rosenstiel, p. A-9.

113 FM 90-2, pp. 1-4 to 1-7.

114 Washington Post Writers Group, "Now is the Time for Best Reporting on Persian Gulf War," Kansas City Star, 20 Mar. 1991, Sec. C, p. 5.

115 Interview with Tony Clifton. One of Mr. Clifton's associates returned from a visit from the 82nd Airborne where he had been given a briefing on a proposed road to the Euphrates River. This reporter wrote an article about the implications of such a road for the attack. Mr. Clifton withheld the story because it would have been a violation of the security guidelines.

116 Lou Gelfand, "Reporter in War Zone Used Fax to Avoid Censorship," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 3 Mar. 1991, p. 12.

117 For one example of this, see Mike Tharp, "Desert Battle," U.S. News & World Report, 18 Feb. 1991, p. 14. The article listed a town as "Wadi Raf." The town of Rafha was shown on a map on p. 24. The connection was easy to make especially when the author mentioned U.S. and French troops together.

118 James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert (New York: Bantam, 1991), p. 177.

119 Howard Kurtz, "Journalists Say 'Pools' Don't Work," Washington Post, 11 Feb. 1991, p. 1.

120 Apple, p. 15.

121 Arledge et. al., p. 12.

122 Peter Copeland, "Q & A," Public Affairs, Aug 1991, p. 8.

123 Harry Summers, "Like It or Not, News Media are Needed," Air Force Times, 19 Aug. 1991, p. 63.

124 Blackwell, pp. 129, 141. He notes that General Horner used CNN during the opening stages of the war for real time intelligence reports from Baghdad (p. 129). See also Dunnigan, pp. 456-457.

125 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 333-334.

126 Philip Towle, Pundits and Patriots (London: Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1991), pp. 36-37. Mr. Towle cites Edward Luttwak as one of the best known defense experts to be totally wrong in his analysis of the outcome of the war.

127 Interview with COL Purvis.

128 Dunnigan, p. 414.

129 Rosenstiel, p. A-10

130 For two examples of speculation prior to the ground campaign see Guy Gugliotta and George Wilson, "Land Probes May be Bait to Goad Iraqis Into Open," The Washington Post, 9 Feb. 1991, Sec. A, p. 15; Barton Gellman, "'Gut Judgement' Seen as Key to Decision," The Washington Post, 24 Feb. 1991, Sec. A, p. 25.

131 Interview with Tony Clifton; Interview with COL Purvis. Both of these gentlemen came to the same conclusion about Saddam Hussein even though they are from much different professional backgrounds.

132 Valerie Adams, The Media and the Falklands Campaign (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 154.

133 Alter, p. 52

134 There were numerous articles written about the deception operation. For a sample see: Broder, p. A-18; Rosenstiel, p. A-10; Mossberg, p. 3; Weiner, p. A-10; Zucchini, p. C-4; Bernard E. Trainor, "A Case for Strategic Deception in Wartime," San Diego Union, 21 Jul. 1991, Sec. C, p. 4.

135 Dunnigan, p. 351.

136 Fred Feer, "The Lessons of Operation Desert Storm: To Learn, to Avoid, and to Unlearn," (Unpublished report for SAIC, 13 Jun 1991), p. 13.

137 Handel, p. 312.

138 Pavlik, p. 27.

139 Martha FitzSimon, "Public Perception of War Coverage: A Survey Analysis," in Media at War (See note 104), pp. 86-87. The author surveyed nine leading polls from the period 2 Aug. 1990 to 10 Mar. 1991 for this assessment. The final poll, a Times-Mirror Poll taken 14-18 Mar. 1991, confirmed the findings that the American public perceived the security review as about right.

140 Sidle, p. 57.

141 Arledge et. al., pp. 11-13. The media executives were sharply critical of almost every unit in the gulf. Only the 2nd Marine Division and the 101st Air Assault Division were singled out as sensitive to the needs of transmitting the reports rapidly.

142 Interview with Tony Clifton.

143 Arthur Lubow, "Read Some About It: A
Short History of Wartime Censorship, New
Republic, vol. 204, 18 Mar. 1991, p. 23.

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